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Abstract 
This paper engages in an interdisciplinary survey of the current state of knowledge related to the theory, 
determinants and consequences of occupational safety and health (OSH). It first describes the fundamental 
theoretical construct of compensating wage differentials, which is used by economists to understand the 
optimal provision of OSH in a perfectly competitive labour market. The plethora of incentives faced by 
workers and firms in job and insurance markets that determine the ultimate level of OSH are discussed in 
detail. The extensive empirical evidence from the hedonic wage and stated choice approaches used to assess 
the value of OSH is reviewed. The causes of inefficiency and inequity in the market for OSH, such as 
externalities, moral hazard in compensation insurance, systematic biases in individual risk perception/well-
being and labour market segregation are subsequently examined. The implications of government intervention 
and regulation for tackling the aforementioned inefficiencies in OSH are then considered. Finally, the survey 
identifies areas of future research interests and suggests indicators and priorities for policy initiatives that can 
improve the health and safety of workers in modern job markets. 
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1. Introduction 
 
"All too often lives are shattered unnecessarily of poor working conditions and inadequate safety systems. Let me 
encourage everyone to join the ILO in promoting safety and health at work. It is not only sound economic policy; it is a 
basic human right". 
Mr. Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations 
 
The purpose of this survey is to review the current state of knowledge and issues related to theory and empirical 
evidence of the market for occupational safety and health (OSH).  The increasing competition prompted by 
globalisation, the predominance of service-oriented industries, the rising job insecurity associated with labour market 
flexibility and demographic developments in the composition of the workforce (e.g. ageing, feminization), pose 
important challenges for the health and safety of workers in modern economies.  In addition, many governments have 
recently paid greater attention to the need to tackle the non-trivial costs to both individual and societal welfare that the 
lack of OSH entails, as part of their overall strive to overhaul insolvent social security regimes. 
An indication of the considerable costs associated with the lack of provision of OSH is given by estimates of large 
international bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank.  They attribute about 3% of 
lost life years to the factor „work‟ (Kreis and Bodeker, 2004).  Furthermore, social insurance expenditure on OSH (e.g. 
statutory sick pay, disability allowances, industrial injuries disablement and incapacity benefits) accounts for 
approximately 2-3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in most advanced economies, exceeding by far what is typically 
spent on unemployment benefits (Adema and Ladaique, 2009).
1
  International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates also 
show that work-related diseases and accidents account for economic losses as high as 4% of world-wide GDP (ILO, 
2003).  Around 4 million accidents at work resulting in more than 3 days of absence occurred in the EU-15 in 2005 
(European Commission, 2009, p. 19).  This corresponds to an incidence rate of 3100 non-fatal and 3.5 fatal accidents per 
100,000 workers.  Furthermore, for each worker in the EU-15 an average of 1.3 working days is lost each year due to an 
accident at work and 2.1 days are lost because of other work-related health problems (European Communities, 2004).  2-
4% of contracted work hours are also estimated to be lost due to sickness absence (Lusinyan and Bonato, 2007).  Some 
calculations suggest that the socio-economic costs of (sickness) absence in advanced Western economies account for 
between 2-3% of their total GDP (EUROFOUND, 1997), that is a typical year‟s growth.  Similarly, the estimated direct 
and indirect costs of work-related injuries and illnesses in the US are approximately $170 billion annually (CSTE, 2005; 
CDC, 2007).  All of the above figures neglect other major non-quantifiable costs, such as private insurance and health 
care outlays that affected individuals face, the indirect costs that companies incur (e.g. training inexperienced 
replacement workers, administrative expenses, production bottlenecks, low employee morale), the impact on families 
and communities and the inefficiency of having a large proportion of a potentially active workforce disabled, idle or 
prematurely retired. 
The equilibrium level of OSH in economies is determined by the interplay of incentives faced by workers and firms 
in labour and insurance markets.  This level is influenced by government regulation that is implemented in order to 
tackle any market inefficiencies that may arise.  To the extent that the above costs reflect market inefficiencies, the need 
for up-to-date information on OSH is of critical importance in order to identify areas of required action and to set 
priorities for policy initiatives on improving health and safety at work.  According to recent ILO (2008) estimates, the 
global number of work-related fatal and non-fatal accidents and diseases has been relatively stable during the past 10 
years, despite the significant improvement in OSH attained in many developed economies.
2
  This is mainly due to the 
globalization process and rapid industrialization that have led to a deterioration of OSH performance in relatively poor 
countries which are unable to maintain effective OSH standards. Hence the need to focus on health and safety is 
paramount, given that “the traditional hazard and risk prevention and control tools are still effective but need to be 
completed by strategies designed to address the consequences of a continuous adaptation to a rapidly changing world of 
work” (ibid, 2008, p. vii).   
The purpose of this survey is, thus, to review and augment current knowledge on the economics of occupational 
health and safety (Viscusi, 1993; Brown and Sessions, 1996; Shapiro, 1999; Ruser and Butler, 2009) by utilizing a 
comprehensive multidisciplinary approach.  By synthesizing the available economic literature with evidence from 
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disciplines such as occupational medicine, epidemiology, psychology and sociology, the survey provides a holistic 
overview of the market for OSH and of its implications for individual workers, companies, economies and societies.  
This is important, since OSH constitutes an area of lively discourse across disciplines, but complementarities in the 
methodological or empirical findings have not yet been brought together (Weil, 2001). The review therefore employs an 
integrative analysis in order to provide a useful guide to researchers and policymakers, who may be bewildered by the 
voluminous but disparate amount of publicly available information on the issue of OSH.
3
  
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 outlines the fundamental theoretical construct used by economists 
for analyzing OSH equilibrium in a perfectly competitive market.  The determinants of the plethora of incentives faced 
by workers and firms in job and insurance markets and the extensive empirical evidence from the hedonic wage and 
stated choice approaches used to assess the value of OSH are discussed in Section 3.  Section 4 focuses on the causes of 
inefficiency and inequity in the market for OSH, such as externalities, moral hazard in compensation insurance, 
systematic biases in individual risk perception/well-being and labour market segregation.  Section 5 examines the 
implications of government intervention for tackling the aforementioned inefficiencies.  Finally, Section 6 concludes by 
reviewing the major findings that can inform public policy on OSH and by identifying areas of future concern.   
 
2. The Market for OSH: Theoretical Underpinnings 
The level of OSH in an economy is determined by the interplay of incentives faced by workers and firms in job and 
insurance markets and is moderated by the regulatory activities of government.  Economists have typically analyzed the 
safety decisions of both employees and firms in a perfectly competitive market as the outcome of a complex set of 
factors reflecting various costs and benefits of investing in OSH (Viscusi, 1993; Shapiro, 1999; Ruser and Butler, 2009).  
On the one hand, workers are assumed to be rational and fully-informed agents who are likely to demand a “wage 
premium” as compensation for OSH risks.  Their safety activities on the job and their degree of absenteeism once ill or 
injured is also believed to be affected by their exposure to social insurance and compensation benefit schemes.  On the 
other hand, employers are assumed to face a trade-off between the cost of investing in health and safety precautions and 
the expected benefits of such actions, most notably lower wages offered to employees as compensation for job 
disamenities or risk.  The equilibrium level of OSH in the economy is therefore the outcome of the interaction between 
the labour demand and labour supply decisions of firms and workers, respectively. 
 
2.1 The Market for OSH: Heterogeneity in market opportunities offered by employers 
In the spirit of Henderson (1983), a convenient formalisation of the safety decisions faced by employers in market 
economies is shown in Figure 1.  In the absence of regulation, a sufficient condition for profit-maximising firms 
selecting the optimal safety level, Sf* (or, equivalently, the optimal job risk level, Rf*), is that their OSH decisions should 
equalize their OSH costs and OSH benefits at the margin. The ante-factum outlays associated with improvement in 
workplace conditions (e.g. preventative practices, OSH training) are likely to rise as the level of health and safety 
increases. This is reflected in the convexity of the total costs (TC) curve in Figure 1.  The post-factum benefits (or, 
equivalently, reduced damage costs) are associated with having to pay lower („compensating‟) wages and workers‟ 
compensation due to the reduction of workplace injuries and illnesses, a lower level of sickness absence and sick pay, 
reduced insurance premiums, and the evasion of other non-trivial costs to the firm (disruption in production, replacement 
of specifically-trained workers, low worker morale, bad reputation etc.).  These are likely to fall at a diminishing rate as 
OSH levels increase, as shown by the downward-sloping total benefits (TB) curve, since the severity of incidents at 
higher levels of safety are subdued.  As illustrated in Figure 1, only at Sf* (Rf*) is the cost of extra safety equalised with 
the value of the benefits that an inframarginal unit of job safety entails for a given firm.    
 [INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The above reasoning implies that in order to maintain constant profits, firms must offer lower wages (w) to offset 
any marginal addition in the cost of OSH.  The wage offer of a given firm is therefore an increasing function of job risk, 
as is depicted by the concave isoprofit curve (II) in Figure 2.  Furthermore, the optimal wage-risk pairs (Rf,wf) that can 
maintain the same level of profits are likely to vary across different firms, given that they face a diverse set of 
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technologies and job hazards.  Working environments differ with respect to the exposure of employees to various inputs 
of the production process, most notably physical agents (e.g. noise, vibration, radiation, room temperature), chemical 
agents (e.g. asbestos, lead, benzene, pesticides), poor ergonomics (e.g. inconvenient work postures, repetitive 
movements, lifting of heavy materials), adverse working times (long and irregular workdays, shifts, night work) and 
workplace violence (bullying, harassment, discrimination).  For instance, smaller-sized firms and „blue-collar‟ industries 
with a predisposition to the use of heavy metallic instruments, like engineering or shipyards, exhibit a greater degree of 
noise and vibration at work compared to other firms (Mery, 1973; EU-OSHA, 2000; Pyykko et al, 2007).  The 
occupational medicine literature also highlights the negative health and safety effects due to contact with chemical 
substances in various trades (White and Proctor, 1997; Wong and Trent, 1999).  Notable examples include the use of 
pesticides by agricultural workers (Hanke and Jurewicz, 2004) and the possibility of neural disorders suffered by 
workers in manufacturing jobs requiring regular contact with solvents, paints and various organic substances (Grasso et 
al., 1984; Wang and Chen, 1993; Kaukiainen et al., 2008).  Carcinogen substances (e.g. acrylamide, asbestos, benzene 
etc.) are also particularly prevalent in industrial sectors (Collins et al., 1989; Marsh et al., 1999; Swaen et al, 2007).  
Moreover, workers employed in the manufacturing and health and social work sectors are frequently found to be 
affected by musculoskeletal disorders (e.g. repetitive strain injury (RSI), carpal tunnel syndrome and tenosynovitis), 
given that they are often required to engage in repetitive movements (EU-OSHA, 2000, p. 38-40).  Finally, individuals 
working in service-sector occupations that rely on interfacing with the public (e.g. health and social work, hotels and 
restaurants, education and public administration) are at higher risk of suffering from physical or mental violence, 
bullying and (sexual/racial) harassment at the workplace (Cassitto et al., 2003). 
It is therefore clear that firms differ in their ability to trade-off the costs of providing a safer working environment 
with the expected benefits (particularly, a lower wage bill).  This is illustrated by the heterogeneity in the wage offer 
curves II and JJ of two hypothetical firms in Figure 2.    
 
2.2 The Market for OSH: Heterogeneity in preferences of workers for job risk 
On the supply side of the market it is assumed that rational workers, who have perfect information and exhibit a high 
degree of labour market mobility, are likely to demand a wage premium as compensation for their willingness to endure 
danger on the job that is not covered by their ex post accident or sickness insurance.  In order to maintain expected utility 
constant, a given worker will therefore demand alternative levels of wage compensation for varying degrees of job risk, 
as summarized by the U1U1 curve in Figure 2.  However, workers exhibit differential tolerances to risk for a variety of 
reasons related to economic and demographic circumstances or simply differences in tastes (Ruser and Butler, 2009, p. 
305).  This heterogeneity in workers‟ willingness to be employed in disagreeable job environments can therefore be 
depicted in Figure 2 by the dissimilar expected utility loci of two hypothetical workers, U1U1 and U2U2.       
                
2.3 The Market for OSH: Compensating wage differentials for job risk and other disamenities 
Superimposing the labour supply choices of individuals on the wage offer curves of firms results in what is known as 
“the fundamental long-run market equilibrium construct” of labour economics (Rosen, 1986), namely the theory of 
compensating wage differentials (CWDs).  Rooted in the insightful work of Adam Smith‟s Wealth of Nations (1776), the 
theory predicts that market forces will ensure the payment of wage premiums by firms which are characterised by 
inferior working conditions, as a means of recruiting and retaining valuable labour.
4
  It is further postulated that in a 
perfectly competitive labour market a positive equilibrium wage-risk relationship (shown by line EE) should arise due to 
the “matching” of the preferences of workers and firms.  This is shown by the points of tangency between the expected 
utility loci and the market wage opportunity curves, (r1, w1) and (r2, w2), in Figure 2.  Risk-averse workers are thus 
expected to take up jobs in firms which find it optimal to provide a safer work environment, whereas less risk-averse 
workers are more willing to be employed by firms which face a dearer marginal cost of safety provision.
5
  Such an 
assortative matching procedure predicts that jobs characterised by a higher degree of job risk (or other disamenities) 
should, in equilibrium, offer compensating wage rents, ceteris paribus.  Therefore, market forces ensure that CWDs raise 
the cost of non-OSH provision to firms.  This provides them with an inherent incentive to provide an adequate level of 
health and safety to their workforce.   
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
3. Empirical Evidence of the Equilibrium Wage-Risk Trade-off 
As discussed in the previous section, at a given wage rate the optimal level of safety selected by firms, Sf*, occurs at the 
point where their OSH costs and OSH benefits are equalized at the margin.  Furthermore, the set of tangencies between 
different firms‟ offer curves and different workers‟ indifference curves traces out an upward-sloping equilibrium wage-
risk line.  The remainder of this section is therefore devoted to reviewing the existing empirical evidence on, first, the 
determinants of the costs and benefits encountered by firms, and, second, the existence of CWDs in market economies.     
 
3.1 Determinants of the OSH cost curve 
A number of studies show that firms that take a more proactive stance toward the development of a comprehensive 
workplace risk prevention and assessment system are more likely to have lower accident rates than those which only 
follow the minimum legal requirements.  The former firms may therefore benefit by having to pay lower wages as 
compensation for the exposure of employees to OSH risks.   
Hunt and Habeck (1993) examined a sample of 220 firms in the US State of Michigan in order to establish the 
relationship between certain workplace risk prevention parameters and indices for the frequency and severity of 
accidents.  The study suggests that there is a need for firms to generate and process internal information, investigate 
accidents and incidents fully, foster the emergence of a “prevention culture” and promote programmes to enhance 
workplace ergonomics.  These findings are confirmed by Dembe et al. (2004), who suggest that targeted prevention 
strategies are required for reducing the likelihood of occupational injuries, such as worker self-assessment of the total 
physical effort demanded by a job and periodic monitoring of workforce job satisfaction.  Wilson (1996) shows further 
that health promotion programmes (e.g. ergonomic management, anti-smoking campaigns, purchase of personal 
protection equipment, stress management seminars, nutritional awareness) that take the form of comprehensive rather 
than single-goal programmes are most likely to succeed if there is appropriate coordination at all levels of an 
organisation (upper management, OSH professionals and personnel).  Furthermore, in a study for Spain, Arocena et al. 
(2008) construct a risk prevention index that quantifies the intensity of firms‟ preventive efforts, using a sample of 213 
industrial firms.  This measure is based on questions regarding six preventive dimensions, such as measures designed to 
eliminate risk at source, training, communication and workers‟ participation, risk control, actions taken in view of 
foreseeable changes, documentation and emergency prevention, preparedness and response.  Using a negative binomial 
regression that takes into account non-observable firm heterogeneity, it is shown that the intensity of occupational risk 
prevention is crucial for the reduction in the number of accidents.  They also illustrate that there are important synergies 
between innovative preventive effort and organisational factors with respect to their effect on the improvement of OSH 
in a workplace.   
The provision of OSH training to employees constitutes an additional strong preventative action that is associated 
with reduced workplace injuries and disease.  In a wide-ranging literature review of published reports drawn from the 
period 1980 to 1996, Cohen and Colligan (1998, p. iv) find “overwhelming evidence to show the merits of training in 
increasing worker knowledge of job hazards, and in effecting safer work practices and other positive actions in a wide 
array of worksites”.  The study shows that factors such as the size of the training group, the length/frequency of training, 
the method of instruction, the trainer credentials, and other extra-training factors (e.g. goal setting, feedback, 
motivational incentives and managerial actions) are significant determinants of the success of the training process.  
However, attention is drawn to the fact that many intervention studies fail to adequately decouple the provision of 
training from other forms of intervention (e.g. engineering, ergonomics). 
Shannon et al. (1997) review the evidence on the relationship between the institutional structure of an organisation 
devoted to OSH promotion and injury rates.  They focus on the influence of joint health and safety committees (e.g. 
representation, duties), the management style and culture (e.g. delegation of authority) and the organisational philosophy 
on OSH (e.g. role of top management, OSH training).  They find  that variables which are „consistently‟ correlated with 
lower injury rates are those that reflect “a genuine concern by management for its workforce”, such as empowerment of 
the workforce, encouragement of long-term relations and systematic evaluation of safety hazards.  No evidence is found 
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to support the use of disciplinary procedures for safety violations or other types of policy regulation.  Fenn and Ashby 
(2004) also argue that larger-sized firms may be more safety conscious given that they face a greater degree of 
monitoring by regulators, safety inspectors or insurers and/or that small firms may lack the necessary resources for 
investment in safe technology or health and safety programmes.  The authors show that UK firms with a higher 
proportion of unionised employees and with health and safety committees are associated with a greater risk of reported 
injuries and illnesses (a finding that persists even after they correct for endogeneity).  They suggest that this result is 
likely to reflect the superior reporting of accident and illness occurrences within establishments where the 
aforementioned internal governance mechanisms are present.   
 
3.2 Determinants of the OSH benefit curve 
Firms will endure the burden of engaging in costly OSH prevention and risk assessment efforts provided that the 
expected benefits outweigh the immediate outlays.  Some of the most important benefits include lower rates of 
workplace injuries, illnesses, spells of sickness absence and a higher degree of overall job satisfaction on behalf of the 
workforce.  Such features are desirable as they are likely to translate into a greater ability of firms to offer lower 
(„compensating‟) wages to employees and payment of lower insurance premiums or workers‟ (sickness or post-injury) 
compensation.  The literature summarised below identifies a number of important determinants which are related to the 
ability of firms to profit from the above benefits.  
 
3.2.1 Accidents at Work  
Gyekye and Salminen (2006) argue that the probability of work-related accidents has its roots in two major causes, 
namely the internal dispositional characteristics of workers and external causal factors such as the characteristics of the 
working environment.  Dembe (2001) also takes into account the broader social, economic and cultural context. 
In their attempt to identify the factors that are correlated with workplace injuries or accidents, researchers use a 
number of empirical methodologies.  Poisson analysis (Alamgir et al., 2007), negative binomial models (Strong and 
Zimmerman, 2005; Blanch et al., 2009), ordered probit (Barling et al., 2003) and logistic regressions (Maiti and 
Bhattacherjee, 1999; Ghosh et al., 2004; Gauchard et al., 2006) are most commonly utilized.  Askenazy (2006) also 
employs a bivariate probit model that takes into account the (non-random) process of reporting an injury by employees.   
The literature suggests that there are significant variations in the rate of workplace injuries across individuals of 
different gender and distinct economic sectors.  Men are most at risk from suffering an (predominantly fatal) accident 
(Krause et al., 2001; Askenazy, 2006).  The manufacturing, construction, agriculture and transport sectors exhibit a 
higher injury rate compared to other industries.  The incidence of occupational accidents is correlated with a number of 
other factors, such as company size (Fenn and Ashby, 2004), age (ageing and experience are negatively related to non-
fatal accidents, though the reverse is true for fatal accidents) and outsourcing of labour (European Commission, 2009).  
Krause et al. (2001) and Dembe et al. (2004) show that there exists consistent evidence of a close link between 
occupational injuries and socioeconomic and work-related characteristics, such as low education, low family income, 
rural residence, unemployment history, blue-collar employment, long hours of work, monotony, lack of autonomy at 
work and job dissatisfaction.  In particular, job satisfaction and other individual subjective evaluations of working 
conditions have also been used as predictors of the probability of work injury (Barling et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2004; 
Gyekye and Salminen, 2006; Gauchard et al., 2006).  This research shows that job satisfaction may act as a mediating 
factor that lowers the chance of a work accident occurring by influencing workers‟ commitment to safety management 
policies.      
A number of studies show that there is a positive relationship between injury claim rates and precarious contract 
status.  It has been suggested that particularly in times of higher aggregate demand there is no incentive for firms to train 
workers on temporary and casual contracts on matters of OSH (Guadalupe, 2003).  Temporary workers are also 
unfamiliar with the workplace surroundings and with the operation of machinery and equipment, so they are more 
susceptible to workplace accidents.  Probst and Brubaker (2001) show that employees with greater perceptions of job 
insecurity exhibit lower motivation and compliance to safety efforts.  This, in turn, is related to higher levels of 
workplace injuries.  Guadalupe (2003) shows that in Spain being in a fixed term contract increases the probability of an 
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accident by four to seven percentage points, which persists even after correcting for the systematic selection of workers 
into different contracts.  However, Amuedo-Dorantes (2002) argues that the higher rate of work accidents observed in 
the case of temporary workers may be attributed to their inferior working conditions, because, once these are controlled 
for, fixed-term employees exhibit an even lower probability of suffering a work accident than their permanent 
counterparts.  Garcia-Serrano et al. (2008) provide further evidence to support this hypothesis, using administrative 
register data from Temporary Help Agency (THAs) workers in Spain.  They find that THAs have a lower probability of 
suffering from a serious/fatal accident and a smaller duration of absence compared to workers on non-THA temporary 
and open-ended contracts, after controlling for a set of personal, job and accident characteristics.  They interpret this as 
an indication that agency workers potentially benefit from specific safety and health training programmes provided by 
THAs.   Finally, Hernanz and Toharia (2006) analyse the effect of contract type on the rate of work related accidents in 
Italy and Spain, using the 1999 „ad hoc module‟ of the Labour Force Survey.  They find that, once personal and job 
characteristics of workers are controlled for, there appears to be no difference in the probability of a work accident 
between open-ended or temporary contracts.   
It has been argued that workplace accident rates exhibit a procyclical nature that is related to greater employee 
effort and stress, lack of experience, utilization of inadequate capital equipment or due to a greater prevalence of short 
term employment contracts during periods of economic boom (Kossoris, 1938; Brooker et al., 1995).  Ashfaw et al. 
(2011) focus on industrial differences in the association between the business cycle and the incidence of workplace 
injuries in the US.  Using nonfatal injury rates from 1976 through 2007 obtained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
database, their cyclical sensitivity is found to significantly differ across industries.  Specifically, pro-cyclical associations 
between business cycle indicators and injury incidence are found in mining, construction and manufacturing but not 
agriculture or trade.  The potential contributors to the positive cyclical association are also found to differ, with physical 
capital utilization being the primary culprit in the mining sector in contrast to labor utilization in construction.  It is 
therefore argued that different prevention strategies are necessary in each sector.  Crucially, additional precautionary 
measures appear to be required in these sensitive industries during periods of upturns in economic activity.  Boone and 
van Ours (2006) investigate further whether the procyclical nature of workplace accident rates is truly related to a 
deterioration of workplace conditions.  The authors suggest that high accident rates during periods of low unemployment 
arise as a spurious phenomenon caused by the reporting behaviour of workers.  They propose that the reporting of an 
accident is likely to dent a worker‟s reputation and raise the probability of lay-off.  Hence one expects to observe lower 
reporting of accidents by workers in periods of high unemployment, when the likelihood and the costs of layoff are 
greater, and vice versa.  Evidence in favour of such a mechanism is given by the fact that a negative relation is only 
found between unemployment and non-fatal accidents in 17 OECD countries.  As no significant association is evident 
with respect to fatal injuries, the authors conclude that from a policy perspective there is no urgent need to worry about 
workplace safety when in cyclical upturns work-related accidents increase.  A similar finding is also reported by Davies 
et al. (2009), who investigate cyclical fluctuations in the rates of workplace injury in the UK for the period 1986 to 2005.  
Their analysis demonstrates the importance of both compositional effects and individual reporting behaviour to 
understanding the variation of workplace injury rates across the business cycle.  In particular, time-series analysis 
confirms that there is a positive elasticity of injury rates to fluctuations in economic activity that is stronger for minor 
injuries.  Using a GLS fixed effects estimator to control for industry level effects, they also find that fluctuations in the 
rate of both minor and major injuries are related to the level of new hiring and the ratio of actual to usual hours worked.  
However, only minor injuries are found to be related to workers‟ bargaining power.  This suggests the presence of 
opportunistic behaviour on behalf of workers with respect to the reporting of minor injuries during times of favourable 
labour market conditions.    
 
3.2.2 Occupational Diseases 
In most developed countries it is recognized that illnesses are work-related provided that they are included in an official 
„list of occupational diseases‟ by the national authorities.  However, a general trend in recent years has been to move 
towards a more relaxed „open system‟, where conditions of workplace risk exposure are considered on an individual 
basis (Walters, 2007, p. 17).  Establishing the cause of work-related diseases is complex, as other non-work related 
factors may be responsible for causing an illness or aggravating a pre-existing medical condition.  Furthermore, it may 
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take decades for some occupational diseases to develop and therefore to be listed in official registers (e.g. respiratory 
diseases such as asbestosis, silicosis and mesotheliomas).   
The most prevalent health problems caused by work in the modern job market include musculoskeletal disorders, 
respiratory and skin diseases and psychosocial health problems (Krause et al., 2001).  According to NIOSH (1997) and 
EU-OSHA (2000), musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) are among the most common of work–related health problems in 
the US and the EU-27, predominantly affecting blue-collar workers.  Around 25-30% of European employees are 
affected by them (e.g. 27% complain of backache and 23% of muscular pains), while they are estimated to account on 
average for 20.5% of the total compensation costs of European countries (Eurogip, 2004, p. 12).  Respiratory and skin 
diseases are also quite prevalent occupational diseases, with exposure to asbestos, silica and other diseases of the 
respiratory tract accounting for more than 40% of total compensation costs in Europe, and skin diseases for an additional 
10% (Eurogip, 2004, p. 12).  Occupational asthma and dermatitis, in particular, are reported to have the greatest effects 
on productivity costs, ranging from 16.5 to 23 billion euros, respectively (Pickvance, 2005).  Work organization factors 
such as job control, job demand, work pace and hierarchical relations are involved in provoking or aggravating 
psychosocial health problems (e.g. stress, depression, anxiety and pulmonary disorders) (Cox, 1978; Wege et al., 2008; 
Ali and Lindstrom, 2008).  For example, EU-OSHA (2000) reports that around 30% of the European population is 
exposed to stress primarily caused by work, typically in service sector jobs.  Joensuu and Lindsstrom (2003) provide an 
extensive review of the role of stress and work factors in terms of affecting sickness absence.  They report that in 
Sweden the percentage of long-term absentees due to psychological problems increased from 14% in the early 1990s to 
25% in 2001.  However, even though it is believed that psychosocial problems have an aetiological negative influence 
on health and well-being, it is difficult to provide an estimate of their overall economic cost.  One potential reason for 
this is the interaction between physical features of the work environment with psychosocial elements.  Leather et al. 
(2003), for instance, argue that there is a relationship between ambient noise levels and job stress, while Foppa and 
Noack (1996) show that stress at work is associated with musculoskeletal pain. More research is therefore required to 
detect the underlying causalities associated with psychosocial problems and attributes of the work environment.  
Related to mental health outcomes is recent research that has examined the determinants of job satisfaction and its 
relation with individual health and overall well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  Job satisfaction is consistently ranked as 
one of the most important facets of life satisfaction and of the quality of life (EPICURUS, 2007).  It is also strongly 
correlated with aspects of employee behaviour and performance, such as absence or quits (Freeman, 1978; Clegg, 1983).  
Stansfeld et al. (1998) argue that job satisfaction may have an indirect influence on workers‟ health through both 
physical and psychosocial avenues.  Hence, improvements in job satisfaction over time may prevent workers from health 
deterioration.  The meta-analysis of Faragher et al. (2005) provides a systematic and thorough review of the research 
linking work-related stress factors with ill health.  Employee self-reported job satisfaction emerges as having by far the 
strongest link with overall wellbeing relative to other factors, while a strong positive relationship with both mental and 
physical health is found (both statistically and clinically).  The relationships are particularly impressive for aspects of 
mental health, specifically burnout, lowered self-esteem, anxiety and depression, though the correlation with subjective 
physical illness is relatively modest.  More recently, Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009) employ objective measures of health 
from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) database.  This is done in order to overcome the measurement error 
problems of self-reported assessments of health status and to address the issue of cross-sectional causality with job 
satisfaction.  Importantly, the authors find that employees with higher job satisfaction levels feel healthier and are more 
satisfied with their health, so that improvements in job satisfaction over time have the potential to shield workers from 
adverse health developments.  These results assume greater significance in the face of evidence suggesting that the 
intensification of work and poor job conditions in recent decades is associated with reduced employee motivation and 
job satisfaction (Green and Tsitsianis, 2005; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2009).  Indeed, they highlight the possibility 
that a direct link might exist between OSH policies that improve conditions within the workplace and the state of 
employees‟ overall physical and mental health.                
         
3.2.3 Sickness Absence 
The causes of absenteeism are in general multi-faceted, and are influenced not only by the health status of individuals, 
but also by the social insurance system, the work environment, biological factors, attitudes and commitment to work, 
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macroeconomic conditions and other social and psychological determinants.  Regardless of the above complexities, the 
relevant literature distinguishes the causes of absence into two main components.  On the one hand, it is viewed as the 
manifestation of workers‟ labour supply decisions trading-off their limited input of time between the substitutable 
activities of „work‟ and „leisure‟ (Allen, 1981; Brown and Sessions, 1996).  On the other hand, ill health and infirmity is 
believed to be a predominant factor underlying worker‟s propensity to take days of leave (EUROFOUND, 1997, p. 21). 
It is hard to obtain accurate measures of absence, especially since cross-country administrative data sources are 
relatively incomparable due to the marked differences in social insurance systems (in terms of the level of sickness 
benefits, length of time before payment, request of medical certificate inter alia).  For this reason, a number of authors 
have attempted to measure the incidence and determinants of absenteeism via subjective measurements of lost work 
hours (Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Heywood et al., 2008; Pouliakas et al., 2010) or by exploiting the discrepancy in actual 
and usual hours of work from standard Labour Force Surveys (Barmby et al., 1991). 
Applied psychologists were the first to study the causes of worker non-attendance, attributing its incidence 
primarily to the existence of job dissatisfaction (Steers and Rhodes, 1978).  Nevertheless, some of the earliest economic 
studies, such as those by Barmby et al. (1991, 1995) in the UK, Ruser (1991) in the US, Johansson and Palme (1996) 
and Henrekson and Persson (2004) in Sweden, focus on the dynamic labour supply responses of employees to sick pay 
compensation or to other economic incentives that they face.  These authors provide evidence of well-determined effects 
of the sick pay scheme and of the terms of the job contract (such as the wage) on the incidence and duration of absence.  
Other papers suggest that there are optimal reactions of employees to manipulations in their compensation via the 
provision of financial incentives (such as performance-related pay) (Wilson and Peel, 1991; Brown et al., 1999; 
Engellandt and Riphahn, 2004; Hassink and Koning, 2009; Pouliakas et al., 2010).   
In addition, there appear to be cyclical fluctuations in the absence rate (Leigh, 1985; Kaivanto, 1997; Arai and 
Thoursie, 2005; Askildsen et al. 2005; Engstrom and Holmlund, 2007), since high unemployment is believed to act as a 
“discipline device” on the shirking behaviour of workers (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  However, some researchers have 
emphasized that a potential “selection” mechanism is at work, whereby absence-prone workers are more likely to be 
fired in recessionary periods and (re-)hired during booms (Arai and Thoursie, 2005).  Nevertheless, the fact that the 
strength of the procyclical nature of absenteeism persists even amongst countries with high employment protection 
legislation casts some doubt on the latter hypothesis (Lusinyan and Bonato, 2007). 
Demographic factors are identified as important determinants of absenteeism.  The female sickness absence rate is 
consistently higher than the male one (Barmby et al., 1991; Vistnes, 1997),
6
 a higher pattern of lost man-hours is 
observed with age (Ercolani, 2006), the presence of young kids in a household increase the likelihood of absence 
(Vistnes, 1997; Dione and Dostie, 2007) and the region of residence plays an important role (Barham and Begum, 2005).  
Furthermore, absence rates vary according to a plethora of job characteristics.  Specifically, they decrease with rising 
earnings (Ercolani, 2006; Dione and Dostie, 2007) and increase with tenure, although absenteeism turns out to be low 
during probationary periods in which workers strive to impress their employers (Riphahn and Thalmaier, 1999; Ichino 
and Riphahn, 2005).   
Industrial differences are notable, with industries with the highest absence rates typically found in the public sector 
(Ercolani, 2006).  The proportion of employees on fixed term/temporary agency contracts, who face a greater risk of job 
loss, is negatively related to the absence rate (Hernanz and Toharia, 2006; Bradley et al., 2007), while a positive link 
between unionisation and absenteeism is also found (Leigh, 1981; Allen, 1984).  A number of studies explicitly examine 
the correlation between the size of the firm and absenteeism (Barmby and Stephan, 2000; Fenn and Ashby, 2004).  They 
show that absence rates are higher in larger-sized firms.  This may imply that big firms face extra difficulties in 
monitoring their workforce, or that they are able to insure against absence via a buffer-stock of (substitute) workers.   
Furthermore, the fact that the highest absence rates are observed in secondary sector occupations (e.g. process, 
plant and machine operatives), which are typically characterised by regular contact with hazardous materials and hard 
manual work, constitutes evidence of a correlation between absenteeism and poor working conditions.  Ose (2005) 
shows that “bad” job attributes (high levels of noise in the work area, a high degree of monotonous work, heavy or 
frequent lifting or poor work postures) in the Norwegian labour market contribute to ill health, which, in turn, results in 
increased long-term absence.  In a systematic literature review, Michie and Williams (2003) identify a number of job 
attributes as key factors associated with psychological ill health and sickness absence, such as long work hours, work 
overload, lack of control over work, lack of participation in decision-making, poor social support and unclear 
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management and work roles.  Finally, Bokerman and Illmakunnas (2008) consider the interaction of a whole host of 
adverse working conditions variables, job dissatisfaction and sickness absence via a recursive multivariate probit model 
in the Finnish labour market context.  They show that the prevalence of „harms‟ at the workplace is associated with job 
dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction is, in turn, related to sickness absence.  This implies that the improvement of working 
conditions should be considered a policy priority and an integral part of any policy scheme that is intended to decrease 
the incidence of absenteeism.  
Variables reflecting the working time of individuals are often examined as covariates of the absence rate, since 
these have important implications for the mismatch between desired and contractual hours (Drago and Wooden, 1992; 
Brown and Sessions, 1996).  Other factors that are examined include whether employees engage in shift work, whether 
they are on part-time contracts or if they are entitled to any other form of flexible working time arrangements (e.g. 
annualised hours, flexitime, working from home).  Lusinyan and Bonato (2007) argue that flexible working time 
arrangements are generally found to be associated with lower employee absence because they reflect the extent to which 
the constraint of contractual hours is relaxed.  However, it is important to bear in mind that firms which find absence to 
be less costly might also be those that offer flexible working time schedules in the first place, so estimates of the effect 
of non-binding hours on absence usually suffer from endogeneity bias.  Moreover, shift work and irregular working time 
patterns are found to interfere with the biological and social rhythm of employees (Finn, 1981; Dahlgren et al, 2006), so 
they are believed to contribute to higher absence.
7
   
Recent research has focused explicitly on the internal workings of organizations, in an attempt to identify the 
equilibrium rate of absenteeism within a given labour market.  Coles et al. (2007) use a unique matched employer-
employee dataset from France, showing that the nature of the production technology of firms can play a significant role 
in terms of the shadow price for absenteeism (i.e. the amount that firms are willing to pay to achieve a unit reduction in 
the absence rate).  Specifically, they argue that absence is more costly in firms employing a so-called “assembly” or 
“just-in-time” production technology.  The latter are therefore more likely to respond to absence via greater monitoring 
and the provision of additional and/or more generous sick pay.  Coles et al. (2007) augment their analysis with the 
supply-side of the market, by identifying the increase in pay that is required by workers for a marginal reduction in their 
hours of absence.  In this manner, they obtain structural estimates of the equilibrium rate of absence.    
In a similar spirit, Pauly et al. (2002), Heywood and Jirjahn (2004) and Heywood et al. (2008) focus on the 
interrelation between teamwork, monitoring and absence. It is confirmed using representative samples of German and 
UK establishments that firms with interdependent productivity (team production) face a higher cost of absence, and as a 
consequence expend additional resources on the task of monitoring absence.  Firms with teamwork subsequently face a 
lower absence rate relative to those that do not rely on productive interactions among workers. 
The difficulty of obtaining internationally comparable data on worker absenteeism has hampered any attempts to 
analyze cross-country differences in patterns.  Barmby et al. (2002) highlight that similar forces operate across nine 
advanced Western economies, such as a negative relation of absence with the wage rate.  Bergendorff et al. (2004), 
Osterkamp and Rohn (2007) and Lusinyan and Bonato (2007) investigate the relationship between international sickness 
absence rates and institutional characteristics of labour markets, after controlling for differences in age structures, health, 
unemployment and participation rates (among other determinants).  They find higher absence rates in the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the UK relative to other countries.  They also confirm that the level of sick pay and the generosity 
in terms of granting sick leave are important determinants of cross-country differences in sickness absenteeism.  
Moreover, absenteeism is found to be significantly and positively related to the strictness of employment protection 
(EPL) that increases the cost of dismissal to employers.  Nonetheless, this finding is disputed by Frick and Malo (2008), 
who claim that once the effect of EPL on absenteeism is disentangled from the effect of the type of contract, there is no 
significant association between EPL and the number of absence days. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that a number of researchers have recently turned their attention to the determinants 
and consequences of the related phenomenon of sickness presenteeism, defined as the tendency of workers to attend 
employment despite illness (Chatterji and Tilley, 2002; Skatun, 2003; Dew et al., 2005).  Though research on this issue 
is still in its infancy, concerns have been raised given evidence that sickness presenteeism is related to future sickness 
absenteeism (Aronsson et al., 2000; Bergstrom et al., 2009; Bockerman and Laukkanen, 2010), and that the cost of the 
former in terms of lost productivity may be substantially greater than that of the latter (Goetzel et al., 2004).  
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3.3 Empirical Evidence on Compensating Wage Differentials in Market Equilibrium  
3.3.1 The Hedonic Wage Methodology 
There exists an extensive literature providing estimates of the presence and extent of CWDs via estimation of so-called 
hedonic wage equations.  Predominant attention has been paid to the “value of a statistical life” approach (Thaler and 
Rosen, 1976), which attempts to detect the monetary value that employees themselves place on their lives, on the basis 
that they are willing to accept jobs of a higher likelihood of a fatal accident occurring. 
Acknowledging that non-fatal accidents and illnesses can also have debilitating and life-changing effects, 
economists have widened the scope of the value of life approach by implementing a hedonic wage framework that also 
considers non-fatal risks.  Conventionally, a (linear) Mincer-type wage equation is estimated in an attempt to describe 
the market equilibrium line EE in Figure 2, as follows:
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where wi are earnings of individual i (i = 1,..., N), fi and ri are fatal and non-fatal job-related risks, respectively, the vector 
x contains a number of confounding factors reflecting individual and job characteristics that are used as control variables 
and ui is a random error term.  In various specifications the vector x has also been specified to include the workers‟ 
compensation benefits that are payable for job injury (Butler, 1983; Viscusi and Moore, 1987).  The regression estimates 
of the parameters 1  and 2 are hence believed to provide an unbiased measure of the wage premium required to 
induce workers to accept an extra marginal unit of (fatal or non-fatal) job risk.  The parameter 1 has also been typically 
used to calculate the value of a statistical life (VSL), namely the total monetary amount that a society would be willing 
to pay in order to reduce the probability of death by one individual.   
Numerous studies suggest that, ceteris paribus, workers in jobs associated with a higher degree of fatal risk and 
unhealthy working conditions command a higher wage compared to safer jobs (Thaler and Rosen, 1976; Olson, 1981; 
Marin and Psacharopoulos, 1982; McNabb, 1989; Viscusi, 1993; Arabsheibani and Marin, 2000; Viscusi and Aldy, 
2003).  In particular, the majority of the estimates of VSL are significant and exhibit considerable variation around the 
$3-$9 million range (Viscusi, 1993, p. 1930; Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).  This relatively wide discrepancy arises mainly 
due to differences in the samples examined and alternative empirical specifications.  For instance, Viscusi (1993, 
p.1928) notes that some of the earlier studies tended to use data pertaining to high risk occupations (Thaler and Rosen, 
1976).  This resulted in underestimation of VSL due to self-selection of individuals with lower wage-risk preferences 
into hazardous jobs.  Researchers have also employed appropriate interaction terms of the fatal risk variable with a 
number of other factors to explore potential heterogeneity in CWDs.  For example, Thaler and Rosen (1976) and Aldy 
and Viscusi (2007) use interaction effects with age, since one should expect age-related differences in the propensity of 
workers to accept job risk (possibly related to variation in consumption patterns over the lifecycle).  Another source of 
bias in CWDs is the endogenous choice of union membership, since wage levels are restricted by collective bargaining.  
While a number of studies have found evidence in favour of the hypothesis of the endogeneity of union membership 
(Marin and Psacharopoulos, 1982; Siebert and Wei, 1994), others have failed to establish a convincing pattern 
(Arabsheibani and Marin, 2000).  The evidence of gender disparities in wage-risk tradeoffs is also ambiguous, which is 
likely to be due to the greater concentration of women in white-collar jobs with low fatality risks (Ruser and Butler, 
2009, p. 308). 
Although the majority of studies confirm that there exist positive and significant CWDs for non-fatal injuries 
(Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), a number of authors have highlighted that such wage-risk tradeoffs do not always transpire 
(Siebert and Wei, 1994; Sandy and Elliot, 2005; Wei, 2007).  These studies have typically suffered from an inability to 
distinguish between alternative types of severity, frequency and duration of injuries.  In general, estimated CWDs are 
found to be larger for relatively more severe injuries that cause lost workdays (Viscusi, 1993, p. 1935). 
Sandy and Elliott (2005) and Wei (2007) investigate the existence of CWDs for job-related illnesses, highlighting 
the fact that employees face a far greater risk of illness at work rather than fatal or non-fatal injury.  Sandy and Elliott 
(2005) find evidence of significant CWDs for manual male workers only.  Wei (2007) confirms this finding using data 
from the UK‟s 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), which permits the construction of establishment-
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specific illness and accident rates.  He finds that the estimated wage compensation for one job-related illness episode per 
year ranges from 27% to 140% of annual earnings, depending on gender and estimation methodology. 
Notwithstanding the appeal of the aforementioned approach, a number of researchers argue that there are 
significant shortcomings associated with the estimation of hedonic wage functions.  The most prominent of these are 
measurement error in the risk variables and the endogeneity between job risk and earnings (Moore and Viscusi, 1990).  
The former is said to arise due to “aggregation bias” (Lalive, 2003), given that broad industry or occupation level 
measures of job risk are typically used in the literature.  However, this masks the important discrepancies in the level of 
job-specific risk faced by people who perform different tasks, even if they are classified within the same industry or 
occupational category.  The risk data also fails to distinguish between injuries that are attributable to the job environment 
and those which are due to workers‟ safety behaviour (Viscusi, 1993, p.1925).  Another source of measurement error 
may also be at work in studies that ignore the influence of non-fatal job risks on workers‟ remuneration, since the latter 
are collinear with respective fatal risks (Arabsheibani and Marin, 2000).  In addition, many occupational diseases are 
underrepresented in official government registers, while existing data sources typically contain insufficient information 
on specific non-fatal risks (Karnon et al., 2005).  Elliott and Sandy (1998) illustrate that overstatement of job 
disamenities by employees who are dissatisfied with their pay brings into question the validity of CWDs obtained on the 
basis of subjective employee responses to questions about job risk.  Following the above arguments, Viscusi (2004) 
confirms that measurement error bias tends to lead to underestimation of estimates of CWDs.  
The heterogeneity in individual preferences for risk and income is likely to compromise estimates of CWDs too, by 
masking important unobserved factors that can simultaneously affect both individuals‟ taste for earnings and their 
preferences for job risk (Garen, 1988; Hwang et al., 1992; Hintermann et al., 2008).  For instance, it is often argued that 
since safety can be considered to be a normal good, people in non-manual jobs or those who enjoy a higher level of 
human capital can “afford” to select jobs with better working conditions (Biddle and Zarkin, 1988).  On the demand side 
it might also be the case that employers offer superior market opportunities (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) to high-
skilled workers, due to job-specific training of the latter (Viscusi, 1993, p. 1917).  The above arguments imply that the 
wage-risk tradeoff is likely to be an increasing function of wealth, with the “best jobs” in society also being the “best 
paid”.  This highlights the need for empirical studies to carefully control for the heterogeneity in firm and employee 
characteristics related to ability, education and productivity.  Proposed methods to circumvent this problem in the 
literature have included the use of either rich matched employer-employee datasets, panel data methods that control for 
unobserved individual (but not firm) heterogeneity or utilization of appropriate instrumental variable (IV) techniques 
(Arabsheibani and Marin, 2000; Johansson and Palme, 2001; Wei, 2007; Hintermann et al., 2008).  Nevertheless, a 
significant shortcoming of the longitudinal and matched employer-employee studies is their inability to accurately 
capture heterogeneity in technologies and product/factor prices, which are underlying determinants of the market price 
for risk.  The IV approach also suffers from an ad hoc choice of instruments.   
 
3.3.2 The Stated Preferences Approach: Willingness to pay for job safety 
In light of the above deficiencies of the revealed preferences approach, recent research has employed the stated 
preferences methodology of estimating the “willingness-to-pay” (WTP) of individuals for risk reduction.  Subjective 
WTP estimates typically utilize survey methods in order to elicit the magnitude of the rate at which individuals are 
willing to forgo income in exchange for additional safety, which would nevertheless keep their utility unchanged i.e. 
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where in a perfectly competitive labour market and pertinent to a local range of risk increments, it is expected that 
2 )(RWWTP , where β2 is the estimated coefficient of the hedonic wage equation (1).   
The stated preferences methodology has become increasingly popular among economists since the early 1990‟s, 
despite the strong reservations of mainstream theorists who traditionally rely on “what people do” rather than on what 
they “say they will do” (Easterlin, 2004).  Indeed, the longstanding tradition in economics is to infer decision processes 
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on the basis of observed choices in market settings, and to treat any subjective data as suspect due to the incomparability 
and inconsistency of individual responses (Samuelson, 1938).  However, powerful theoretical and practical reasons have 
been advocated in favour of eliciting subjective evaluations of expectations and events by survey respondents.  It is 
argued that due to the unobservability of counterfactual outcomes, researchers often act with partial information.  
Therefore, observed choices may be consistent with many alternative specifications of preferences and expectations.  It 
is therefore likely that revealed preferences do not necessarily conform to the rational expectations hypothesis of 
axiomatic expected utility theory (Manski, 2004, p. 1330).  Indeed, behavioural research (described in detail in Section 
4.1. below) emphasizes that informational biases, cognitive inadequacies, impulsive behaviour and time inconsistency 
are underlying human traits that may drive a wedge between intended welfare and actual market choices (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008).  On this basis, the revealed utility concept is argued to be inadequate for the purposes of public policy 
evaluation as it essentially assumes the optimality of individual behaviour (Kahneman et al., 1997).  In addition, WTP 
estimates allow the assessment of the relative efficacy of various health and safety interventions that entail non-marginal 
risk changes, as opposed to hedonic estimates which focus on risk decisions at the margin.  On a practical level, the need 
to employ stated choice data is also spurred by the unavailability of necessary information for evaluating non-market 
goods, such as natural resources (Hanley, 1989; Adamowicz et al. 1994; Hanley et al., 2001) and health care (Ryan and 
Farrar, 2000).  Empirical estimation of stated choice models is encouraged further by the significant number of studies 
over the last thirty years indicating that “practically speaking, stated and revealed preferences seem to match up 
surprising well in different choice contexts, cultures and time periods” (Louviere et al., 2000, p. 12). 
       Stated preferences research was originally carried out by using the so-called contingent valuation approach.  
This approach relies on asking respondents to provide direct monetary valuations of alternative policy measures on 
simulated market contexts (Gerking et al., 1988; Miller et al., 2002).  To overcome the inconsistency of simple open-
ended questions, which are subject to cognitive burden and response bias (e.g. protest bids, yeah saying, embedding 
effects), researchers have developed more pragmatic contingent markets (Diamond and Hausman, 1994).  This is 
achieved via the design of a realistic payment vehicle (such as the specification of sensible income-taxation trade-offs or 
comparisons of goods in a similar nonmonetary dimension) and by providing sufficient information for individuals to 
make informed choices.   
Originally used in the fields of marketing research and transport (Luce and Tukey, 1964; Green and Srinivasan, 
1978), the complementary choice modelling approaches of conjoint analysis and of relative valuations have been 
increasingly employed by economists to enable valuation of multidimensional policies.  Both of these methods seek to 
imitate the actual choices of individuals in quasi-market settings by asking them to make a series of deliberate 
hypothetical choices between alternative scenarios (which are differentiated by attributes and levels).  In the conjoint 
analysis approach, the WTP of individuals is indirectly obtained by including an income variable within the set of 
attributes describing a realistic job scenario (or „vignette‟).  Van Beek et al. (1997), for instance, use such a method to 
detect employers‟ preferences for desirable characteristics of job applicants, van Leeuwen and van Praag (2002) assess 
policy measures for stimulating lifelong on-the-job training in the Netherlands and Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2010[b]) 
report estimates associated with workers‟ WTP to avoid insecure job contracts and physically demanding jobs.  In the 
relative valuations approach, instead, indirect monetary valuations are obtained against a suitable peg event for which a 
reliable valuation exists.  Karnon et al. (2005), for instance, evaluate the benefits of the prevention of non-fatal work-
related accidents and ill health pegged against monetary valuations for the prevention of road deaths.   
Stated preference methodologies constitute a valuable contribution to informing policymakers about the 
effectiveness of novel and multidimensional OSH interventions, since they allow researchers to widen the scope of risk 
options available to respondents that may not be available in market data.  Caution is nonetheless warranted on the 
grounds that choices elicited in hypothetical settings are likely to be affected by the degree of „contextual realism‟ that 
the researcher establishes for the respondents (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008, p. 225).  In particular, the set of attributes 
need to be free of errors in risk perceptions, in the sense that they should closely correspond to probability events that 
individuals encounter in reality and which can be carefully evaluated on the basis of pre-existing experiences (Viscusi, 
1993, p. 1942).  The processing of risk information and the undertaking of complex choices by individuals within a 
survey context is also reliant on their cognitive capacity (learning and fatigue effects) and on their commitment to the 
exercise (Manski, 2004, p. 1343).  Finally, stated choices must obey similar axioms such as those stipulated in rational 
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consumer choice theory (e.g. transitivity and monotonicity), as individuals may resort to the use of heuristics (e.g. 
maximin strategies) in the face of complex scenarios (Hanley et al., 2001, p. 449). 
 
4. Sub-optimal Allocation of Job Market Risk 
The existence of CWDs that are conducive to the attainment of an efficient degree of OSH provision on behalf of firms 
hinges critically on the strong requirement that competitive markets forces are at work.  Nevertheless, convincing 
arguments exist on both efficiency and equity grounds that predict that the equilibrium level of OSH provision, as 
determined in the theoretical realm of the free market in Figure 2, is likely to be suboptimal.    
 
4.1 Efficiency considerations 
The efficiency of market forces, as shown by point Sf* Figure 1, is likely to be diluted due to ineffective collective 
bargaining and transaction costs, important externalities in the provision of OSH, moral hazard problems in 
compensation insurance markets, asymmetric information and systematic biases in individual risk perceptions.  As 
Figure 3 makes clear, the above market inefficiencies imply that the competitive level of OSH provision might turn out 
to be less than the efficient level (Sf‟ < Sf*).  In this case, a discrepancy arises between society‟s willingness to pay for 
risk reduction and market valuations of the cost of OSH when measured at current levels of risk exposure (Biddle and 
Zarkin, 1988; Herzog and Schlottmann, 1990).
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4.1.1 Externalities 
If the contractual parties do not internalize all of the damage costs of workplace injuries or diseases in their OSH 
decisions, the social costs of risk reduction will exceed the marginal costs faced by individual agents.  In this case, 
economic theory predicts that a less than optimal degree of OSH is likely to prevail in the economy.     
For instance, within the workplace it may be the case that reckless behaviour on behalf of some workers may lead 
to a greater probability of injuries for their colleagues (Viscusi, 2006, p. 19).  Similarly, despite the offer of workers‟ 
compensation insurance (discussed in more detail below), it is unclear whether firms fully account for the effects of 
unfortunate OSH occurrences on the continuing employment displacement, disablement and quality of life of employees 
(Weil, 2001).  Job injuries/illnesses are likely to hamper the work ability and ex post productivity of workers following 
an incident.  The working time lost during a recovery period may also have negative implications for the workers‟ stock 
of human capital and their subsequent earning capabilities (Woock, 2009).  This might explain why individuals who 
experience injuries and diseases related to work face a higher probability of unemployment, engage in early exit from the 
labour market or encounter increased difficulties with respect to re-entering into suitable employment (Pransky et al., 
2005).  Crichton et al. (2005) examine the effects of work-related accidents on the future labour market outcomes of 
individuals, using data from New Zealand.  They highlight that injury severity (defined as those cases where individuals 
receive earnings compensation for more than 3 months) is associated with negative future prospects.  They show that 
injured individuals of longer duration have lower employment rates and incomes after returning to the labour force, with 
women, older-aged individuals and the lower-paid being more susceptible to negative outcomes.  Similar findings are 
provided by Reville and Schoeni (2001), who report that lower employment opportunities and increased income losses 
are observed for workers with permanent partial disability due to occupational factors.  Workers in the manufacturing 
sector seem to suffer from the greatest economic losses when compared to the rest of the workforce, athough this loss is 
ameliorated when the severity of injury is smaller.  It is therefore proposed that national policies should have a dual 
purpose, namely to provide economic support to such target groups via adequate compensation benefits and also to 
improve prevention programs that will increase OSH.  Woock (2009) finds that the annual earnings losses are highest for 
workers who suffer from a work-limiting disability following injury.  In line with the above, a recent study estimates the 
impact of bad health on individual productivity and employment status in the UK (HSE, 2008).  Using the standard 
Mincer (1974) specification of an earnings equation on data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), it is 
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found that an individual‟s health has a strong and significant impact on productivity.  Specifically, those who are in 
excellent health earn 4-7% more than those with average health, while poor health suffer from a 7-15% wage penalty.  
Moreover, the probability of being in work is found to decline as the individual‟s health status worsens, with those 
benefiting from excellent (poor) health having a 17% (34%) higher (lower) probability of being in employment 
compared to those with average health.            
Retirement decisions are particularly affected by OSH episodes.  Newton et al. (2007) provide evidence that a 
significant portion of the European labour force remains idle following an adverse OSH event, as individuals do not feel 
capable of performing the work that they did prior to the incident.  Pransky et al. (2005) argue that 11% of the workers 
in their sample planned to retire earlier due to the experience of a work-related injury, with job dissatisfaction acting a 
significant mediator in the occupational illness-retirement nexus.  Tüchsen et al. (2009) confirm that job injuries are a 
strong determinant of the decision of individuals to take a disability pension retirement, although this is only found to 
hold for their male sample. 
In addition to intensifying the strain on public finances and pension systems, there is a dearth of empirical research 
on the impact of poor health and workplace accidents on macroeconomic and social outcomes.  In a study commissioned 
by the HSE (2008) in the UK, the effect on GDP of ill health caused by work is explored based on the estimation of a 
regional growth equation that covers the period 1995 and 2005.  The analysis shows that a higher incidence of poor 
health and long-standing illness is associated with negative economic growth, with an elasticity of 0.02.  This effect is 
relatively robust to the inclusion of controls for industry structure.  Moreover, Dembe (2001) highlights that in addition 
to the more traditional costs of occupational injuries, the social consequences of accidents and ill health on the lives and 
daily activities of affected workers, their families and their immediate communities are sizeable and have generally been 
neglected in the public discourse.  
The debate about the external consequences of accidents and illnesses is reflected in discussions of the appropriate 
legal compensation for future wage losses in a tort suit.  Indeed, it is often argued that “tort compensation for personal 
injuries generally provides for economic damages and coverage for noneconomic loss that is below the levels of the 
value of statistical life pertinent for establishing efficient incentives for accident prevention” (Viscusi, 2006, p. 26).  
Lewis et al. (2003) and Butt et al. (2008) have shown that the current method of awarding damages in tort in UK courts, 
which relies on actuarially-determined labour market hazards (known as Ogden Tables), fails to compensate injured 
claimants fully for their loss of future earnings.  This is found to be particularly the case for a non-uniform group of 
claimants, namely men, younger individuals, the disabled and those with post-injury earnings capacity. The source of the 
under-compensation is attributed to the fact that the current multiplier-multiplicand method used to settle injury claims, 
which converts annual losses in earnings due to injury into a discounted lifetime capital sum, neglects to take into 
account earnings growth over a claimant‟s working life and the „conditionality‟ of future employment patterns on current 
activity status. 
 
4.1.2 Moral hazard in insurance markets 
Workers‟ compensation insurance (including sickness and income benefits) and tort law provide strong incentives that 
can influence the behaviour of workers and firms with respect to observed injury and claim incidence, duration of 
absence and costs (Ruser and Butler, 2009, p. 315).
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  On the employee side, safety precautions taken on the job, filing 
claims for injuries sustained and the duration of time taken off work following an occupational accident or illness may 
all be influenced by the anticipation of ex post compensation.  Similarly, liability for compensation of injured workers 
and the associated payment of insurance premiums may act as deterrents that induce firms to respond by either investing 
in OSH improvements or by engaging in manipulative reporting and/or lobbying efforts.  
In most advanced industrial countries employers are generally responsible by law to contribute towards insurance 
schemes that cover for the medical expenses of injured workers, as well as the replacement of a portion of the lost stream 
of future earnings in case of employment displacement and continuing disablement.  In some cases firms are also 
required to provide for rehabilitation services and the payment of income benefits to dependants in the case of workplace 
fatality (Ruser and Butler, 2009, p. 313).  A survey of the costs and funding of injury and disease compensation schemes 
in Continental Europe finds significant variations among countries, where the cost of occupational diseases accounts for 
over three quarters of the total cost of compensation and exceeds that of occupational injuries by around 10-20%.  Table 
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1 shows that the cost to insurance organizations for compensation and rehabilitation in 2000 ranged from over 1 billion 
euros in Germany and Italy to 23 million in Austria (Eurogip, 2004, p.6).  In addition, it has been estimated that the cost 
of occupational injury, measured in terms of the compensation paid by insurance companies to victims who brought civil 
liability suits against their employers, is between 100 to 250 million euros per year (Eurogip, 2004, p. 5). However, the 
extent to which a prospective reduction in these damage costs has a sufficient bearing on an employer‟s safety 
performance depends on the criteria for pricing insurance and on employer-employee „risk-bearing‟ and „claims-
reporting‟ moral hazard (Butler and Worrall, 1991; Shapiro, 1999, p.603).   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Any positive impact that higher indemnity benefits might have by inducing firms to undertake safety 
improvements, are likely to be mitigated by the fact that workers may compromise their vigilance for safety and increase 
the frequency of (fraudulent?) claims.  As summarized by Ruser and Butler (2009, p. 325), the available empirical 
evidence generally concludes that rising benefits are associated with an increase in the incidence of claims (with a claim 
rate/benefit elasticity that ranges between 0.4 and 1.1), particularly for harder-to-diagnose cases (e.g. back sprains).  
There is also evidence of a positive link between the magnitude of benefits and the duration of claims.  Meyer et al. 
(1995), for example, compare claims duration using a “natural experiment” setting of differential maximum income 
benefits offered by two US states.  They find that time out-of-work spells increased for those eligible for higher benefits, 
though the value of their benefits/duration elasticity of 0.4 is smaller compared to other estimates in the literature (Ruser 
and Butler, 2009, p. 331). 
In many countries the insurance premiums paid by firms are not a real reflection of their true safety record.  In 
some cases (e.g. US), firms‟ contributions differ with respect to the degree to which the premiums are “experience-
rated”, with smaller-sized firms often paying standardised “manual rates” calculated with respect to an average level or 
risk within given industrial-occupational classifications.  In other states (e.g. Sweden, Austria, Portugal, Belgium) a 
single rate is applied to all enterprises regardless of activity and risks and usually as a percentage of the payroll (Walters, 
2007, p. 21).  The divergence that is caused between the price of workers‟ compensation insurance and the actual OSH 
conduct of most employers is therefore expected to weaken their incentives to invest in safety, since this will have a 
negligible effect on their future insurance premiums.  Empirical evidence on whether such an “experience-rating effect” 
prevails broadly supports this hypothesis, though not all research has been conclusive (Ruser and Butler, 2009, p. 326).   
Employers may also be inclined to engage in other methods to avoid reparation payments, which are cheaper than 
OSH prevention efforts.  Some examples include the exertion of pressure on workers by either discouraging them to file 
a claim or to misreport its severity, placing them on light duty or expediting a premature return to work.  Companies also 
often aggressively pursue lobbying activities that seek to influence policymakers with respect to the stipulation of rules 
governing worker‟s compensation insurance (e.g. capping legal fees, making types of injuries noncompensable, 
restricting the choice of doctors etc.).  Such actions often result in employers not bearing the full cost of workplace 
accidents.  It is also notable that firms are often held accountable for only a small portion of occupational illnesses, given 
the difficulties in establishing causation between the workplace and occupational diseases and in proving workers‟ 
exposure to the latter (Shapiro, 1999, p. 608).  All of the above avenues may serve to alleviate the attainment of an 
efficient degree of OSH prevention on behalf of firms.   
 
4.1.3 Asymmetric information and systematic biases in risk perception and preferences 
Inefficiencies are also likely to arise since competitive markets require the existence of full information between the two 
sides of an employment relationship regarding workplace risks.  However, it is often the case that employees suffer from 
an informational disadvantage relative to their employers, particularly with respect to the actual probability of incidents 
occurring within specific occupations and their likely severity.  “Accidents that occur relatively rarely, or industrial 
diseases that take years or even decades to manifest themselves after initial exposure to the hazardous agent causing 
them, are unlikely to be known with any degree of precision” (Henderson, 1983, p. 79).  Furthermore, it is often the case 
that in the absence of appropriate legal advice employees exhibit ignorance with respect to their entitlements to 
compensation and face difficulties in handling the administrative complexity of insurance schemes (Walters, 2007, p. 8).  
It is therefore reasonable to expect that in such cases a wedge is drawn between the perceived and the actual risks that 
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workers face in a job.  This will result in lower wage premiums demanded per unit of actual risk, as they are not entirely 
aware of the dangers to which they will be exposed to in their employment.   
Evidence from cognitive psychology and behavioural economics research also highlights that even if employees 
are fully informed about objective probabilities pertaining to job hazards, systematic biases in individual risk perception 
are likely to result in consistent miscalculation of the odds of accidents/illnesses at work occurring.  According to the 
predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), in the presence of uncertainty people do not always 
process messages about risk in a „rational‟ manner (Kahneman et al., 1982; Slovic, 2000; Kahneman and Tversky, 
2000).  There is considerable evidence that human beings have an inbuilt resistance to unwelcome information and that 
they suffer from cognitive limitations (Denscombe, 1993).  For these reasons they tend to employ simplifying heuristics 
in judgement and decision making i.e. simple rules of thumb which enable individuals to handle the enormous amount of 
information at hand by engaging in simpler operations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gilovich et al., 2002).  However, 
these heuristics sometimes lead to systematic errors in peoples‟ interpretation of risk and in their subsequent choices, 
which may depart from those expected on the basis of perfect rationality.   
A number of these biases have been described in the literature.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identify the so-
called representativeness heuristic, whereby people tend to under-use base-rate information in forming judgments.  This 
leads to misperceived probability assessments that either over-infer patterns from short sequences of events that depart 
from the norm, or exaggerate random lengthy streaks (a phenomenon that Rabin (1998, p.24) calls the “law of small 
numbers”).  Another important heuristic includes anchoring and adjustment, which focuses on the fact that arbitrary 
starting points may serve as an anchor for further probability assessments, while adjustments in assessments away from 
this anchor are typically insufficient.  Furthermore, the availability heuristic posits that individuals are influenced in their 
assessment of the likelihood of risks by pre-existing, recent or readily available experiences (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, 
p. 27).    
The availability heuristic may account for the fact that people often overestimate the frequency of rare yet dramatic 
or sensational causes of death (e.g. homicide) and underestimate the frequency of less well-publicised yet common 
causes (e.g. stroke and asthma) (Slovic et al., 1982).  For instance, in an experiment that the prominent psychologist 
Amos Tversky carried out on 120 Stanford graduates, who were asked to assess the probability of dying from various 
causes, the estimate given by the group regarding the likelihood of an accident occurring was 0.32, which differed 
significantly from the „true‟ statistical estimate of 0.05 (Bernstein, 1996).  This divergence between subjective and 
objective perceptions of risk by individuals is also often exacerbated by the fact that human beings are not very receptive 
to or tend to misread any new information that contradicts their initially formed hypotheses, known as confirmatory bias 
(Rabin, 1998, p. 26).  Another pervasive attribute includes optimism bias, since people are commonly found to 
overestimate their personal immunity from harm, such as the chance of experiencing an occupational accident or illness 
(Weinstein, 1989).  Interestingly, even though it is often argued that learning and adaptive behaviour on behalf of 
individuals may act to moderate or ameliorate the above errors in individual judgment (Viscusi, 1979), evidence from 
psychological experiments have failed to support the above notion (Rabbin, 1998, p. 31).      
In addition to any possible misperceptions in the evaluation of workplace risk, there is also contention about the 
economic assumption that workers have stable and well-defined preferences.  Rabin (2000) has proved that conventional 
expected utility theory fails to provide a plausible account of risk aversion over moderate stakes, as a simple calibrating 
exercise shows that assumed risk aversion over small bets implies a rapidly diminishing marginal utility for wealth.  
Instead, it is proposed that a prominent reason for why people behave in a risk-averse manner with regard to small risks 
(even though expected utility theory suggests that they should behave in an approximately risk-neutral manner) is loss 
aversion, the tendency of individuals to value the pain of losses more acutely than the pleasure of same-sized gains 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Rabin and Thaler, 2001, p. 226).  Loss aversion has also been considered to be a culprit 
for the fact that the marginal willingness to pay for risk reduction from an accustomed danger level is typically observed 
to be less than the financial inducements required by individuals to accept incremental additions to risk of a similar 
magnitude.  A related explanation focuses on the so-called status quo bias of prospect theory, which asserts that people 
are likely to prefer their given state of affairs and overreact to the presence of newly identified risks (Rabin, 1998, p. 14).  
In general, workers‟ wage-risk tradeoffs are likely to depend on whether the risk levels deviate substantially from 
individuals‟ “reference levels” of risk, which may be determined by previous job experiences or family background 
circumstances inter alia.  For instance, the required CWDs of employees might be greater for risk levels that are close to 
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their reference points rather than for those that are substantially further away  (a phenomenon known as diminished 
sensitivity bias) (Rabin, 1998, p. 15).  All of the above behavioural arguments have important implications about the 
curvature and continuity of the constant utility loci shown in Figure 2, and are therefore expected to result in wage-risk 
tradeoffs that are different compared to the standard predictions of the economic paradigm.   
Overall there is scepticism in the literature about whether the choices individuals make in response to objective 
information sets regarding wage-risk bundles in various jobs are such that maximize their well-being in the first place.  
Gilbert (2006, p.109) has summarized the evidence from numerous psychological experiments, which point to the fact 
that people make systematic errors in their perception of the future.  One prominent reason is that they fail to account for 
the fact that current emotions intrude on assessments of the future („presentism‟).  Individuals are also quite poor in 
forecasting how quickly hedonic adaptation takes place, whereby changing reference points in response to unfortunate 
events of life and trauma (e.g. paraplegia, unemployment) result in consistent overestimation of the negative impact of 
the latter on future well-being (Brickman et al., 1978; Frederick and Lowenstein, 1999; Dolan and Kahneman, 2008; 
Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2010[b]).  Biases have also been detected in people‟s own assessment of their future utility 
on the basis of recollections of past memories and choices, with peak and end effects obscuring their own evaluations.  
In addition, there is tenuous evidence regarding the stability and dynamic consistency of people‟s preferences.  Framing 
effects are known to lead to different elicited preferences when decision makers choose among two presumably 
equivalent options that are nonetheless stated in a different manner (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).  People are also 
sensitive to context effects and preference reversals when faced with a menu of choices (Rabbin, 1998, p. 37-38).  
Finally, due to individuals‟ propensity towards immediate gratification, their current choices are often inconsistent with 
their long-term preferences (Thaler and Susntein, 2008, p. 44).  All of the above behavioural arguments would therefore 
suggest that there is a discrepancy between individuals‟ ex-ante “decision utility” and their ex-post degree of welfare or 
“experienced utility” (Kahneman et al, 1997).   
 
4.2 Equity considerations 
It is often pointed out that important equity considerations arise in the market for OSH, due to the fact that the social 
class distribution of occupational accidents and illnesses is skewed.  Indeed, job risk tends to affect a relatively 
vulnerable portion of the workforce (e.g. lower educated/lower income individuals) to a far greater extent than 
individuals in higher rungs of the social strata (Henderson, 1983).  Crucially, this may justify public regulation of OSH 
levels even among employees who receive the same CWD within a given occupational category, since there may still be 
inequity in the spread of occupational accidents and diseases across individuals who belong to the same broad 
employment group.   
CWDs are also only likely to arise in a free market when alternative employment opportunities are open to 
workers, as the mobility of labour will, in theory, spur competition among employers in terms of providing an attractive 
[wage, safety] bundle.  However, in industries where accident or illness risk is most prevalent (e.g. manufacturing, 
construction, transportation) there is a higher incidence of workers suffering from a low pay-no pay vicious cycle 
(Asplund et al., 1998; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999; European Commission, 2004; Stewart, 2007).  Jobs are normally 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and refusal of the job offer from the part of the worker may imply unemployment or 
another dead-end job as the only outside options available.  Under such circumstances of labour market segregation, 
employees are expected to be reluctant to quit their current job.  Discrimination may also account for the fact that 
different labour market groups (e.g.  of different race or ethnicity) may face quite different offer curves and thus settle in 
different hedonic market equilibria, with the group facing larger risk being compensated less (other things equal).  
Furthermore, the recent growth in precarious employment in advanced market economies has been generally 
accompanied by the erosion of coverage of workers‟ compensation and legal entitlements in case of injury or disease, a 
weakening of their bargaining power in terms of filling claims and less emphasis on rehabilitation strategies on behalf of 
employers (Walters, 2007, p. 8).  Important equity considerations therefore arise with respect to the inequality of 
opportunity faced by workers who tend to cluster in the lower-end of the labour market (Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 
2010[a]).    
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The literature suggests that labour unions can play a potentially significant role with respect to safeguarding equity 
in the market for OSH (Beaumont, 1983; Walters, 1995).  Labour unions use their political influence, collective 
bargaining and participation in health and safety committees to influence workplace health and safety standards (Hirsch 
et al., 1997; Morse et al., 2003; Donado, 2007).  However, the empirical evidence is not conclusive regarding the effects 
of unions on OSH.  Freeman (2004) suggests that trade unions contribute to the improvement of working conditions and 
of compensation benefits for employees who suffer from work-related health problems.  He argues that, in general, 
unions effectively represent employees‟ interests with regards to health and safety at the workplace.  Litwin (2000) finds 
that the presence of unions in the British labour market contributes to a reduction of job injuries.  Similarly, Siebert and 
Wei (1994) show that unionised workers experience lower fatal injury rates.  Reilly et al. (1995) also illustrate that lower 
injury rates are observed in plants with union representatives in health and safety committees.  In contrast, Fishback 
(1986), Fenn and Ashby (2004) and Donado (2007) provide evidence suggesting that increased unionisation is 
associated with a higher incidence of workplace injuries and illnesses.  This conflicting evidence may be an outcome of 
endogeneity, since it is not only the case that unionisation affects OSH but the reverse might also be true.  In particular, 
hazardous working conditions may motivate workers to participate in unions and seek for voice strategies in order to 
protect themselves (Robinson, 1990; Hirsch and Berger, 2001; Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Nichols et al., 2007).  
 
5. Government Intervention in the OSH Market 
Given the market inadequacies described in the previous section, government intervention might be necessary for an 
economy to attain efficient and equitable levels of OSH.  Such government activities typically take the form of the 
provision of a social security safety net to employees (especially in countries that do not rely on a private insurance 
market), elimination of informational deficiencies, the setting of standards and the imposition of financial penalties or 
prosecution to non-compliers.  The extent to which such actions are beneficial, though, in the sense that they improve on 
market outcomes and enhance societal welfare, needs to be assessed rather than assumed (Viscusi, 2006).
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5.1 Social security  
In most developed countries legally mandated systems exist for providing benefits to workers who suffer from 
occupational disease or injury.  Though in several cases private insurance associations are developed that operate on 
their own or in parallel with a public social security scheme, it is typical for the state alone to administer compensation 
for harm in many countries.  Adema and Ladaique (2009) report that in the year 2005 approximately 2.6% of the GDP of 
the OECD group of countries was devoted on average to expenditure on Incapacity Benefits (including care services, 
disability benefits and pensions, benefits accruing for occupational injuries and diseases and employee sickness 
payments).  Significant variations by country are observed mainly due to differences in the criteria for recognition of 
occupational diseases and eligibility for compensation, with Mexico (0.1%), Turkey (0.2%) and Korea (0.6%) lying at 
the lower end of the spectrum, the US (1.3%), the UK (2.4%) and the EU-19 group of countries (3%) found in the 
middle, and the Scandinavian countries [Sweden (5.6%), Norway (4.4%) and Denmark (4.3%)] featuring at the top 
(OECD, 2009). 
Significant cross-country variation also exists in the institutional features governing the provision of occupational 
disease and injury compensation schemes.  In several countries employers are responsible for full coverage of their 
employees‟ salary for an initial period (typically 3 days), after which benefits from the social insurance scheme take 
over.  Although the basis for compensation traditionally is to recompense victims for loss of earnings capacity, some 
countries (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Sweden) take into account the damage caused on long-term physical and mental 
function and diminished quality of life (Walters, 2007).  In most countries a medical assessment of illness or injury is 
required, which can range from mere validation of disability to the pursuit of a more “aggressive” requirement of job 
incapacity evaluation (e.g. the Pathways to Work initiatives of the UK government).  Moreover, there are significant 
discrepancies in qualifying periods, replacement rates (ranging from 50 percent in Austria to the total of the ceiling 
earnings in Luxembourg and Finland), and in the maximum duration of benefit provision (Walters, 2007, p.43-46).  
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5.2 Information disclosure and indicators of OSH 
When the source of market failure lies in the discrepancy between the perceived and actual risks faced by employees, 
information disclosure by the government could ameliorate the problem, provided that it is clear, well-organized and 
with sufficiently new information content that avoids information overload (Viscusi, 2006, p. 27-28).  Improving 
workers‟ access to information about the nature, severity and relative employment risks that they face is likely to 
improve market performance, by empowering them to form accurate perceptions of the required wage-risk trade-off.  
Providing appropriate training to workers with respect to evaluating the typically overwhelming amount of risk 
information that is available to them may also serve to tackle any systematic biases in hazard assessment as described in 
section 4.1.3 (Shapiro, 1999, p. 601).   
Recently, policymakers (especially within the US and EU) have sought to construct appropriate measures or 
indicators of health and safety that will inform the decisions of major stakeholders within their countries.  The purpose 
of such indicators is to quantify the state of affairs in the workplace infrastructure, inputs and outputs of individual 
economies.  As Rantanen et al. (2001, p. 17) suggests, the socio-economic structure of the economy, including 
demographic conditions, the industrial or service-oriented nature of markets and the technological frontier, are crucial 
factors for determining the state of workplace inputs and the exposure of different risk groups of employees to them.  
Exposure to work-related risk factors is, in turn, one of the main determinants of health and safety outcomes, such as the 
absence behaviour of employees (partly mediated by their job satisfaction), the incidence of work accidents and the 
occurrence of occupational diseases.  These negative OSH outcomes are important as they entail significant direct and 
indirect economic costs at both an individual and societal level.     
A number of important research projects have been undertaken under the auspices of major international 
organizations such as the WHO, ILO and the EU, with the purpose of designing appropriate OSH indicators.  These 
projects identify a plethora of generic and specific indices of OSH, covering a wide range of OSH contingencies.  
Primary examples of these projects include the European Community Health Indicators Project (ECHI) (Kramers, 
2003), the assessment of the state of OSH throughout the EU Member States by the EU-OSHA (2000), or the European 
Commission‟s emphasis on the creation of „good work‟ (European Commission, 2001; EUROFOUND, 2007).  The 
above echoes the ILO‟s preoccupation with the attainment of „Decent Work’ (ILO, 2005).  Other important 
contributions include those of the Finish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH) (Rantanen et al., 2001), the US 
National Occupational Research Agenda (NORA) project (CSTE, 2005; CDC, 2007) and the EU‟s WORKHEALTH and 
HEALTHatWORK projects (Kreis and Bodeker, 2004; HEALTHatWORK, 2010).  The latter projects develop a 
comprehensive set of OSH indicators that become operational by separating them into clear-cut policy domains, such as 
“OSH policy and infrastructure”, “OSH hazards/work conditions” and “OSH outcomes”.  Table 2 below summarises 
some of the most commonly cited indicators of OSH, which have been arranged in a manner that corresponds to the 
structure of this survey.   
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.3 OSH regulation, enforcement and compliance  
There are important differences in the OSH acts and regulations of countries, which usually focus on the criteria required 
for the receipt and duration of sickness/disability benefits, rules determining the framework under which workers‟ 
compensation and tort liability operate and the conduct of OSH inspection and enforcement.  The ILO has a central role 
in providing recommendations and guidance for national OSH policies.  Although the ILO publishes instruments, which 
outline varying levels of obligations for member countries, the latter have to ratify each instrument before 
implementation takes place.  Ratification does not guarantee implementation. The recommendations are for national 
governments to implement or use as a guiding policy. 
A number of studies investigate the factors that underlie the decision to ratify and adopt OSH-related ILO 
conventions.  The length of ILO membership, national income status and regional affiliation are shown to be associated 
with a higher number of ratifications by member states (Wilson et al., 2006).  Boockman et al. (2009) focus on 
developing countries, for which OSH is seldom given priority status due to its costly nature.  They employ an empirical 
methodology that allows for the fact that ratification behaviour is influenced by unobserved characteristics both of 
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countries and of different conventions.  The presence of such effects is argued to stem from the fact that some 
conventions may be more easily ratified than others, since they differ in terms of their degree of flexibility or 
complexity.  Finally, other factors that are identified as possible obstacles to the ratification process include the lack of 
infrastructure, the lack of political will, incompatibility with national legal systems and peer effects (Chau and Kanbur, 
2001). 
The adoption of government regulations in many countries is often governed by principles that are unrelated to 
society‟s willingness to pay for risk reduction, such as the need to take a precautionary stance against dimly understood 
risks using an individual risk threshold or a “technology-based” approach (Shapiro, 1999, p. 612; Viscusi, 2006, p. 39).  
This is in contrast to the usual economic methodology of assessing the efficiency of regulations by utilizing a cost-
benefit approach, where the discounted benefit stream, quantified in terms of the value of a statistical life, must exceed 
the cost per life saved.  The latter is argued to constitute the most cost-effective method of manipulating the population 
mean risk level and thus making the best use of society‟s scarce resources (Sunstein, 1990), athough important 
objections are expressed on the grounds that cost-benefit analysis is unreliable and unethical (Shapiro, 1999, p. 618).  
Furthermore, it is pointed out that significant caution needs to be exercised when undertaking stringent regulatory 
actions, given that offsetting behavioural consequences (moral hazard) may negate any beneficial impacts of the 
regulation.  For instance, the positive effect of any legislation forcing employers to supply personal protective equipment 
(PPE) to their employees might be mitigated by the subsequent complacency of workers, thus leading to more workplace 
accidents.  This is particularly likely to be the case when people overestimate the efficacy of a policy.  The overall 
assessment  of the efficacy of regulations is also complicated by the fact that there might be substantial opportunity costs 
associated with the diversion of resources away from other potentially health-enhancing expenditures (e.g. better health 
care) (Viscusi, 2006, p. 61).     
The success of OSH regulation is also dependent on enforcement by the relevant authorities of the stipulated OSH 
standards and compliance on behalf of the affected agents.  Because compliance with a regulation sometimes involves 
substantial administrative and other costs, rational firms will choose to comply provided that the expected costs of 
noncompliance are greater.  Given that the latter are a function of the likelihood of detection and the magnitude of the 
expected penalty levied, it follows that a low probability of detection plus low fines for violations of OSH standards are 
likely to compromise the efficiency of regulation (Ruser and Butler, 2009, p. 334).  Empirical evidence tends to suggest 
that the estimated effects of OSH inspections on safety are quite small or non-existent (Shapiro, 1999, p. 613), although 
research in this area has found it difficult to circumvent the problem of the endogenous nature of injuries and inspections 
(since inspections usually take place at high-risk industries).   
Several recent studies examine the effectiveness of OSH regulations in promoting OSH labour standards.  Wilson 
et al. (2007) assess the relationship between the ratification status of OSH-related ILO conventions and the reported 
occupational fatality rates of ILO member countries, after controlling for possible confounding factors (such as income 
levels and length of ILO membership).  They show that non-ratifying countries generally have statistically higher fatal 
injury rates.  Based on this evidence, they argue that all countries should promote ratification of ILO conventions aimed 
at improving OSH conditions.  Arocena and Nunez (2009) also highlight the importance of OSH legislation in reducing 
workplace accidents in the “advanced” manufacturing sector (i.e. industries utilising a high degree of technology and 
skilled workforce) in Spain.  However, they fail to identify any significant change in the incidence of accidents in 
traditional manufacturing sectors following the adoption of new OSH legislation.   
A notable study of the UK‟s Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2006) examines the relationship between the OSH 
activity of firms and sectoral performance, using a gross output growth accounting framework.  This research is 
important as it addresses the question about whether the adoption of costly OSH regulations are likely to compromise the 
performance of firms and have negative effects on their economic activity.  It utilises Cambridge Econometrics‟ annual 
time series of input-output consistent volume and value indices of change for 42 sectors of the UK economy from 1970 
and the Bank of England Industry Dataset (2003).  Moreover, it incorporates data on OSH activity and stringency 
measures in the UK collected by the HSE.  No clear evidence is provided on the impact of OSH stringency on 
productivity, although it is suggested that the former might have a negative short-term effect on output as firms struggle 
to meet stricter regulatory requirements.  However, in the long-run, the so-called Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991) asserts 
that newer and better technologies are likely to be adopted as a response to regulatory incentives, thereby enhancing 
productivity over time.  Given that the latter positive effects may only become apparent after a substantial time lag, it is 
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argued by the authors that future research needs to tackle the insufficiency of time-series data which inhibits the 
identification of a time trend on the impact of regulation stringency data on productivity. 
 
6. Policy Recommendations and Issues of Future Concern  
The focus of public policy on OSH has shifted considerably in advanced market economies during the past two decades, 
due to the need to respond to the new challenges posed by rising service sector jobs, adverse demographic developments 
and constraints in public finances.  From a strict focus on the prevention of occupational injuries and industrial diseases, 
OSH has now become a more encompassing concept that considers the overall protection of workers‟ health via 
prevention, maintenance of working capacity, compensation, rehabilitation and, in general, the fostering of an OSH 
culture.  This survey highlights a number of issues that have direct application to public policy.  In order to address some 
of the inefficiencies in the market for OSH, policymakers can engage in various actions that can either influence the 
incentives that workers and employers face or employ direct regulatory activities.  Governments can ensure that workers 
have adequate access to information about job hazards and can require from employers to provide adequate training to 
their employees in order to mitigate potential biases in the processing of such information.  They can also influence the 
cost of noncompliance to firms by manipulating the criteria (e.g. eligibility, coverage etc.) set in workers‟ social 
insurance schemes for offering compensation to injured/ill workers.  Mandating that insurance premiums reflect more 
accurately the health and safety records of enterprises is another avenue of action.  However, there has been distress by 
employers over what are claimed to be exorbitant premiums paid, combined with perceptions of unfairness by workers 
regarding settlements that presumably underestimate the true cost of harm.  This has resulted in a slight reorientation in 
recent years away from „no fault‟ compensation schemes and towards civil law litigation in several countries (Walters, 
2007. p 37).  Furthermore, the authorities can enforce safety standards via targeted inspection, large penalty fines and 
regular monitoring of OSH indicators.  However, calls for employers to bear a Pigouvian injury or illness tax have failed 
to materialize due to the difficulties in setting appropriate tax rates that reflect the incidence of occupational diseases and 
due to foreseen tax avoidance problems (Shapiro, 1999, p. 610).   
Notwithstanding the greater availability of data sources on health and safety at work and the large number of 
studies, a number of relevant topics on OSH require further exploration in future research.  It is expected on theoretical 
grounds that the need for OSH regulation is likely to decline over the long-run reflecting improvements in safety 
technology, greater substitutability of capital for labour and higher incomes that raise the demand for safety (Ruser and 
Butler, 2009, p. 347).  However, it is unclear whether the underlying causes of the falling accident rates observed in 
advanced market economies in recent years can be attributed to the aforementioned mechanisms, or whether they are 
related to exportation of dangerous activities to Third World countries or an increase in informal employment (EU-
OSHA, 2005).   
The implications of the demands of modern job markets for OSH are not adequately researched.  The rising 
incidence of precarious employment raises concerns about the inadequacies in social insurance coverage, weakened 
claims due to inefficient bargaining power and insufficient training and reintegration efforts for workers on non-
indefinite contracts.  The fact that many of the traditional “industrial” OSH risks (e.g. injuries, respiratory illnesses) are 
now aggravated by the increasing stress levels, MSDs and mental disorders associated with job insecurity and market 
flexibility draws attention to the fact that the causes and effects of multifactorial risks need to be investigated further.  
Similarly, the changing demographic evolution of the workforce towards an increasing proportion of female, racially 
diverse and older-aged employees implies that future studies need to investigate closely the OSH risks posed to these 
groups.  There is gender discrimination in social insurance, for instance, caused by the non-inclusion of many female-
dominated occupations in the official lists of registered occupational diseases (Walters, 2007, p. 31).  Migrants and 
ethnically or racially diverse workers are a particular cause of concern, since such individuals are typically employed in 
high-risk and informal sectors, they face linguistic and cultural barriers that prevent appropriate OSH communication 
and training and they are often not covered by social security systems (HSE, 2004).  Indeed, given that a substantial part 
of the working population is employed under the vulnerable conditions of the informal economy, often possessing low 
levels of skills and experiencing low/irregular incomes and long working hours, extension of OSH measures to include 
such informal workers is a challenge for the future (ILO, 2008, p. 19). 
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The effectiveness of OSH rehabilitation and reintegration strategies of firms and national insurance providers, 
which are likely to become progressively important in the face of the increasing strain on social insurance systems, needs 
to be studied further.  It is not yet clear what types of rehabilitation and reintegration procedures (e.g. training partially 
disabled workers in new job tasks, adapting workplaces etc.) are more effective than others.  Furthermore, a related issue 
of concern is the greater vulnerability of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in terms of providing adequate 
OSH prevention and rehabilitation policies given the dearer credit-constraints that they face. 
Due to absence of appropriate longitudinal data sets very few studies examine the labour market prospects of 
employees that return to work following long-term periods of sickness absence or disability, or the overall (economic 
and non-economic) consequences of such prolonged periods of inactivity on individual performance and welfare.  In 
general, studies that attempt to identify the causal relationship between work factors, individuals‟ health status and 
economic and welfare outcomes are fraught with problems of endogeneity, subjectivity bias and measurement error.  
There is also scarcity of empirical research on the causes and consequences of occupational diseases, though improved 
datasets are likely to allow for more accurate measurement of their incidence and identification of correlations with 
individual and job characteristics in the future.     
The harmonisation and international comparability of appropriately-designed OSH indicators in terms of 
comparable definitions, data collection methodologies and quality also remains one of the major challenges of 
forthcoming endeavours.  Most governments in the developed world are presently seeking to redefine the traditional 
remit of OSH towards taking a more forward-looking and comprehensive stance that allows anticipation of the major 
threats posed by modern labour market practices.  Nevertheless, such a task is hindered by the substantial differences in 
social laws and administrative practices across countries which cannot be easily incorporated in the usual statistical 
methodologies.     
Finally, in both policymaking and academic circles there has been a reluctance to embark on economic evaluations 
(cost-benefit analysis) of regulatory policies related to OSH (Viscusi, 2006).  Any methodological and ethical obstacles 
that inhibit accurate economic evaluations of such policies are nevertheless likely to be overcome in the future, given the 
overall need to address issues of affordability and efficiency in social security funds and workers‟ compensation 
schemes.  Overall the jury is still out in terms of whether the apparent ineffectiveness of OSH enforcement is simply a 
reflection of adequate market incentives contributing to the realization of an almost-optimal equilibrium level of OSH.  
It is expected, though, that the fostering of an inclusive culture of OSH via cooperation of all of the major stakeholders 
of an economy (workers, enterprises and governments), has the potential to complement the forces of the market and 
imply significant long-term efficiencies.      
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Figure 1 Efficiency in the Market for OSH  
Source:  Henderson, 1983, p. 78-79. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Equilibrium in the Market for OSH  
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Figure 3 Inefficiency in the Market of OSH  
Source:  Henderson, 1983, p. 80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Cost to insurance organizations for compensation and rehabilitation in seven 
European countries 2000  
Source:  Eurogip, 2004 and Walters, 2007. 
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Table 2  Selected Measures and Indicators of OSH    
OSH Measures Examples of OSH monitoring indicators Source 
1. OSH Costs 
 
 
OSH Budget % of firms‟ budget devoted to OSH promotion, prevention and rehabilitation 
HEALTHatWORK 
WORKHEALTH 
OSH Training 
% of workforce received OSH training within firms HEALTHatWORK 
% of firms‟ budget devoted to OSH training activities HEALTHatWORK 
OSH Management 
% of enterprises that engage in OSH risk assessments HEALTHatWORK 
% of enterprises that keep records of work-related accidents/illnesses/sickness absence HEALTHatWORK 
% of enterprises that have official OSH policies and infrastructures in place (e.g. joint worker-manager committees to 
discuss OSH-related issues and frequency of meetings; OSH employee representative; targets for OSH performance) 
HEALTHatWORK 
% of enterprises that have arrangements in place to support the return to work of employees on long-term sickness 
absence/illness/disability 
HEALTHatWORK 
2. OSH Benefits 
 
 
Inputs 
 
 
Presence of Physical Agents in 
the Workplace 
% employed exposed to high levels of noise, vibration, radiation, abnormal room temperature etc. 
FIOH  
Presence of Chemical Agents 
in the Workplace 
% employed exposed to/in regular contact with dangerous products or substances (e.g. asbestos, lead, benzene, 
pesticides etc.) 
FIOH  
Ergonomic Conditions in the 
Workplace 
% employed whose job involves inconvenient work postures, repetitive movements, lifting of heavy loads etc 
FIOH  
Working time arrangements % employed working very long hours (at least 50h/week) or in irregular shifts (especially nights shifts) FIOH  
Psychosocial Problems 
% employed  who report mental health problems (stress, anxiety, depression, burnout)  HEALTHatWORK 
% employed subjected to threat of physical violence/harassment/threats/violence at work HEALTHatWORK 
Outputs 
 
 
Fatal work accidents Incidence of fatal accidents at work per 100,000 employees 
FIOH  
WORKHEALTH 
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Non-fatal work accidents Incidence of non-fatal accidents at work with more than 3 days of absence per 100,000 employees 
FIOH  
WORKHEALTH 
Occupational illnesses 
No. of ill health cases related to a recognized occupational disease by economic activity per 100,000 employees  
FIOH 
WORKHEALTH 
No. of ill health cases related to a recognized occupational disease per 100,000 employees who were working in the 
last 12 months 
HSE 
Sickness absence % of usual working hours lost in a reference week due to absence related to sickness or ill health  Barmby et al. (1991) 
 
% of employed absent from work in reference week due to own illness, injury or temporary disability WORKHEALTH 
Job Satisfaction / 
Job Quality 
Mean trend of subjective employee well-being scores by country and facets of jobs (e.g. pay, quality of working 
conditions, job security, working hours etc.) 
HEALTHatWORK 
3. OSH Regulation 
 
 
The Size of the Social 
Insurance System 
% of GDP devoted to expenditure on incapacity benefits, including sickness allowances and disability benefit HEALTHatWORK 
Coverage of workers‟ compensation system ( % of total number employed) HEALTHatWORK 
Enforcement and Compliance 
with OSH Activities 
Ratification rate of relevant ILO conventions on OSH FIOH  
Proportion of human resources devoted to labour safety inspection and enforcement (either as part of national health 
and safety executives or in workplaces) (inspectors per 1000 employees) 
FIOH  
% of OSH inspections that are prosecuted /convicted HEALTHatWORK 
Workers’ compensation Annual workers‟ compensation benefits paid and mean amount paid per covered worker NIOSH 
Labour market prospects 
Differences in participation probabilities between formerly injured/ill/disabled employees and healthy employees 
HSE 
HEALTHatWORK 
Differences in wage outcomes between formerly injured/ill/disabled employees and healthy employees 
HSE 
HEALTHatWORK 
Notes: FIOH = Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (Rantanten et al., 2001); HSE = UK Health and Safety Executive; WORKHEALTH (Kreis and Bodeker, 2004); NIOSH = 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (CDC, 2007) 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 For example, disability and sick-pay account for nearly a quarter of social-welfare expenditure in Norway, 
which spends more than 24 times as much on these payments as it does on unemployment insurance.  In Britain, 
unemployment benefits account for less than a tenth of what disability and sickness expenditures cost to the 
government budget. 
2
 For example, the rate of non-fatal and fatal accidents has exhibited a significant downward trend (of 27.4% and 
42.4%, respectively) in the last decade in the countries of the EU (European Commission, 2009). 
3
 It needs to be noted that there is a burgeoning literature examining aspects of the health situation of the 
population in general, such as the effect of various pathogenic behaviours (e.g. smoking, diet, lifestyle) on 
mortality.  However, this survey focuses on issues related to the factor „work‟ and examines the implications of 
the latter for individual (and societal) health and safety.                       
4
 “The wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or 
dishonourableness of the employment” (Smith, 1776, Book 1, Chapter X, Part 1). 
5
 Deleire and Levy (2004) in the US and Grazier and Sloane (2008) in the UK show that individuals exhibiting 
strong aversion to risk (which is proxied by family structure) make occupational choices that are biased towards 
the selection of safer jobs.   
6
 This has been typically attributed to the differential out-of-work commitments of the two genders (e.g. 
domestic duties such as the rearing of children).  Ichino and Moretti (2006), instead, show that a significant 
fraction of the male-female absenteeism gap can be explained by a 28-day cycle, which vanishes for workers 
aged 45 or older.  They interpret this as evidence that the menstrual cycle is responsible for the higher level of 
female absenteeism.   
7
 However, Tuchsen et al. (2008) fail to find any conclusive evidence of a link between shift work and 
absenteeism in a sample of Danish workplaces, after controlling for an extensive list of relevant factors (such as 
age, education, body mass index, smoking status, alcohol consumption, leisure time physical activity and other 
psychosocial and physical work environment factors).   
8
 Viscusi (1993, p. 1916) also describes the use of a more complex structural equation systems approach, which 
has relied on the estimation of two-equations, a utility locus and a market opportunity curve.  This approach 
relies on making specific assumptions about the functional form of the utility function, and has used regional 
economic variables as appropriate identifying constraints of the demand side equation. 
9
 Evidence that workers‟ willingness to pay for risk reduction (i.e. the slope of their indifference curves) exceeds 
the implicit market-clearing price (i.e. the slope of the isoprofit curves of firms) has been obtained with the use 
of “job switching” regression estimates.  The latter exploit the fact that workers “vote with their feet” among 
jobs in various industries, which differ with respect to working conditions and wage compensations.  Combining 
these with estimates from conventional hedonic wage equations, one can predict the wage-risk tradeoff at the 
“quit margin”.     
10
 While in some continental European countries it is possible to claim industrial injury or disease benefits by 
recourse to civil litigation, in most cases social security bears the burden of compensation.  For the purposes of 
ensuring social peace, some countries (e.g. US, Germany) have also adopted the so-called „no-fault‟ systems 
approach, whereby employers on suspicion of causing harm are not liable for civil action as long as they adhere 
to their legally specified contributions to the workers‟ compensation scheme (Walters, 2007, p. 15). 
11
 Viscusi (2006) offers a comprehensive discussion regarding the fact that many government agencies (e.g. 
EPA) tend to use upper bound estimates of the component parameters used in calculating risk. They also focus 
on exposure levels with “reasonable certainty of no harm” (the precautionary principle) and emphasize dimly 
understood risks.  This conservatism bias tends to yield risk assessments that are at the upper tail of the actual 
risk distribution, which is in contrast to the normative approach of assessing economic benefits based on 
society‟s total willingness to pay for risk reduction. 
